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The agreement signed by the Irish and British governments and most of the political 
parties in Northern Ireland on 10th April 1998 (Good Friday) was a truly historic step. 
The agreement itself marks the most significant shift in party political positions since 
the partition of Ireland.  This, coupled with the fact that the agreement is open-ended, 
and indeed under its provisions must develop beyond  what is already agreed to 
survive means that an analysis of the evolution of party political attitudes which led to 
this agreement is essential in order to understand its significance.  The following 
article gives a brief summary of the key provisions of the agreement, analyses the 
processes which led the different parties towards a position where agreement was 
possible and examines the referenda which ratified the agreement North and South 
and election results to the new Northern Ireland Assembly - the public’s first 
opportunities to pass judgement on the efforts of their politicians. 
 
The Agreement 
Some of the provisions of the agreement were relatively predictable and had been 
signalled in various public statements by the two governments, but other new 
elements were genuinely products of the dynamic created in the talks chaired by 
former US senator George Mitchell. (The full text of the agreement is widely available 
including on the internet at www.irish-times.com or cain.ulst.ac.uk).  The 
agreement has five key elements: constitutional changes; new institutions of 
government; an all-Ireland dimension; an equality agenda; and security provisions, 
decommissioning and the release of prisoners. 
 
The parties endorsed the agreement between the British and Irish Governments to 
redraw their constitutional expressions of sovereignty on Northern Ireland.  They 
have set out the broad principles of their new definitions of the constitutional position 
by asserting that they recognise that the position of Northern Ireland within the UK 
would not be chnaged without the consent of a majority if its people and also: 
 that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between 
the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their 
right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently 
given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, 
accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to 
the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;  
 
The British Government agreed to introduce new Northern Ireland constitutional 
legislation to enshrine this position.   The Irish Government agreed to call a 
referendum to seek to amend Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution which define 




Irish Agreement and to allow the Government and Dáil to devolve powers to any 
institutions set up under that agreement.  The effect of the referendum would 
however, if passed, only become operative if the Government declared formally that 
the multi-party agreement was being implemented.   
 
Table 1 Amendments to Articles 2 & 3 of the Irish Constitution 
Present Article 2 
The national territory consists of the 
whole island of Ireland, its islands and 
the territorial seas. 
 
 
Present Article 3 
Pending the reunification of the national 
territory, and without prejudice to the 
right of the Parliament and Government 
established by this Constitution to 
exercise jurisdiction over the whole of 
that territory, the laws enacted by that 
Parliament shall have the like area and 
extent of application as the laws of 
Saorstát Éireann and the like extra-
territorial effect 
 
New Article 2 
It is the entitlement and birthright of every 
person born in the island of Ireland, 
which includes its islands and seas, to be 
part of the Irish nation. That is also the 
entitlement of all persons otherwise 
qualified in accordance with law to be 
citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish 
nation cherishes its special affinity with 
people of Irish ancestry living abroad 
who share its cultural identity and 
heritage.  
 
New article 3 
It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in 
harmony and friendship, to unite all the 
people who share the territory of the 
island of Ireland, in all the diversity of 
their identities and traditions, recognising 
that a united Ireland shall be brought 
about only by peaceful means with the 
consent of a majority of the people, 
democratically expressed, in both 
jurisdictions in the island. Until then, the 
laws enacted by the Parliament 
established by this Constitution shall 
have the like area and extent of 
application as the laws enacted by the 
Parliament that existed immediately 




While these amendments to Articles 2 and 3 broadly met what had been a long term 
unionist and British Government demand, they did not go as far as Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP) leader David Trimble, and unionist commentators such as the Cadogan 
Group, had demanded.  Proposals by the Irish Government, a Fianna Fáil-Labour 
coalition, in 1994 to amend Articles 2 and 3, to clarify that Irish unity would be sought 
by peaceful means only and by consent, if a settlement could be reached in the 
North, were rejected by David Trimble as ‘worthless’ (House of Commons, 14 July 
1994, vol. 246, col. 1158).  They were rejected in similar terms by the Cadogan 
Group (1995:46) and this position was reaffirmed in 1997 by UUP Forum member 
Peter Weir (Northern Ireland Forum, 7 Mar. 1997, vol. 31, p.44). It was argued that it 
is the aspiration for Irish unity and not simply the means by which it is pursued which 
is fundamentally at the heart of the conflict.  Trimble wanted the Republic of Ireland 
and Northern nationalists to abandon all efforts at securing Irish unity and not just 
assert their support for ‘consent’ and peaceful means (House of Commons, 27 Oct. 
1994, vol. 248, col. 1072). Clearly the amendments proposed by the Irish 





Fianna Fáil, as the largest party in the Republic and because of its traditionally 
nationalist stance was concerned to draft an amendment to Articles 2 and 3 which 
did not alienate its own support base, a section of which had spoken out against any 
dilution of the constitutional expression of sovereignty.  The final form of the wording 
seemed to meet with general approval.  Sinn Féin, while not happy with the new 
wording of articles two and three, recognised the very limited practical impact of the 
old Articles. The retention of a ‘firm will’ to bring about Irish unity and in particular the 
strengthening of the right to Irish citizenship of persons born in Northern Ireland, 
something previously only contained in ordinary legislation, also helped to limited 
opposition to the change.  The changes were not welcomed by Sinn Féin, but on 
balance they saw enough in the overall agreement to allow them accept these 
amendments. 
 
The agreement provided for a new Assembly to be elected on June 25th, composed 
of 108 members - 6 elected by PR-STV in each of the 18 Westminster 
constituencies.  The Assembly would have ‘full legislative and executive authority in 
respect of those matters currently within the responsibility of the six Northern Ireland 
Government Departments’ with the possibility that other issues including security 
may be devolved later.  On taking their seats elected members must designate 
themselves as ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’. The Assembly will initially meet in a 
‘shadow’ form without legislative or executive powers to resolve standing orders, 
working practices and to make preparation for the North-South Ministerial Council.  
Key decisions throughout its existence must be made with cross community support 
by either of the methods set out in table 2.  A minimum of 30 members can also insist 
on this procedure.   
 
 
Table 2 Methods of measuring cross community support 
Method 1 
a majority of members who have 
designated themselves nationalist and a 
majority who designate themselves 
unionist must support the measure for it 
to be passed (parallel consent) 
Method 2 
a weighted majority of 60% of all 
members present and voting including at 
least 40% of each of the nationalist and 
unionist designations present and voting 
 
 
There will be an executive made up of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister 
and up to ten others.  The First Minister and Deputy First Minister are elected by the 
process of parallel consent, while ministerial posts will be allocated to parties 
proportionally, on the basis of the number of Assembly seats held. 
 
The North-South Council has been structurally modelled on the EU Council of 
Ministers having twice yearly plenary sessions, and ‘frequent’ ordinary meetings with 
a sectoral format, with each side represented by the appropriate Minister.  The 
Council must ‘use best endeavours to reach agreement’ and make ‘determined 
efforts to overcome any disagreements’.  Each side in the Council must be in a 
position to take decisions while remaining accountable to their own 
assembly/parliament.  The North-South Council must agree a work programme 
covering at least 12 subject areas and set up at least six all-Ireland or cross border 
‘implementation bodies’, before 31 October 1998.  
 
To ensure that the North-South Council actually operates, and is not frustrated by 
unionist opposition, the Assembly and North South Council are declared to be 




Participation in the Council is declared to be ‘one of the essential responsibilities’ 
attaching to a ministerial post.  In the event that a Minister will not attend the First 
Minister and Deputy First Minister can appoint another person in their place.   
 
There will also be a purely consultative British-Irish Council (BIC) made up of 
members of the Irish and British Governments, devolved institutions in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales and English regions if established, the Isle of Mann and 
the Channel Islands. While no party oppose this in principle it was also included to 
act as a fig leaf for the UUP to disguise the all-Ireland nature of the North-South 
body.  The UUP had sought to have the North-South Council subservient to the BIC 
but were not successful in this. 
 
The agreement spells out some quite specific measures in the area of equality 
including a Bill of Rights; a statutory obligation on public servants to carry out their 
functions with due regard to the promotion of equality; stronger fair employment 
legislation; and commitments to promote the Irish language, including making 
provision for the use of the Irish language in public life and to facilitating Irish 
language education in line with current provision for integrated education. 
 
The issue of policing was clearly too difficult to resolve at the same time as 
institutional and constitutional questions. The RUC was by its nature at the heart of 
the conflict, being viewed as the primary defenders of the state by unionists and a 
sectarian force by nationalists. As an institution it has a unionist and British ethos and 
is almost entirely made up of members of the unionist community.  Its relations with 
the nationalist community have never been good and even moderate nationalists 
have refused places on the police authority and have refrained from advocating that 
nationalists should join the force.  The unionist parties remain committed to the RUC 
in its present form, Sinn Féin insists on its disbandment and the SDLP on its 
substantial reform. The agreement simply sets out that a police service must be 
‘capable of attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole’ but 
there were no decisions on the future of the RUC.  The parties agreed to set up an 
Independent Commission on Policing to report back by Summer 1999, and which will 
have expert international representatives among its members. 
 
There were no effective new provisions on decommissioning of illegal weapons.  The 
parties reaffirmed their commitment to the ‘total disarmament of all paramilitary 
organisations’ and to work with the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning.  There is however no clear agreement on what will happen if no 
actual decommissioning takes place, as the Assembly and executive begin to 
function. 
 
Both Governments agreed to put in place legislation, before the end of June 1998 to 
allow for the release within a two year time-frame, of all republican and loyalist 
prisoners affiliated to organisations who have established and maintained complete 
and unequivocal cease-fires (This has since been done).  The British Government 
also agreed to review their emergency legislation and reduce the size of the armed 
forces and the number of security installations in Northern Ireland 
 
Political Party perspectives 
 
For all of the pro-agreement political parties and the two governments the fact that an 
agreement had been reached was welcome in itself. It is clear however that the 
parties have different perspectives on how it should develop, which is important in a 




Ireland, after all in the recent Scottish referendum, the Scottish Nationalist Party 
called for a yes vote on the basis that the parliament would help the campaign for 
independence while Labour called for a Yes vote to save and strengthen the Union.   
 
The fact that political stability was central to the Northern Ireland policies of the two 
governments did not prevent many disputes and near crises between them over the 
duration of negotiations, especially but not exclusively under the Conservative 
government.  (See for example Mallie and McKittrick 1996 or O’Leary and McGarry, 
1996).  The Irish Government was convinced that any agreement which excluded 
Sinn Féin was ‘not worth a penny candle’ (Fergus Finlay, adviser to then Irish 
Foreign Minister Dick Spring, Irish Times 26 Apr. 1996).  The behind the scenes 
involvement of the Irish Government in talks with Sinn Féin in the period 1987-94, 
marked a significant change of policy.  Since at least 1973 successive Irish 
governments have sought to build a solution around the SDLP and the UUP, or most 
of it, in a power-sharing government, isolating more militant loyalism and the IRA.  It 
was presumed that the popular support for such an initiative would allow the 
governments to isolate and defeat the IRA.  The lack of success with this strategy led 
the Irish government in the late 1980s to look at the possibilities for an inclusive 
peace process, involving Sinn Féin and the loyalist paramilitaries, which sought to 
achieve cease-fires in advance of all-party negotiations.  This change in perspective 
was greatly strengthened with the election of Albert Reynolds as leader of Fianna 
Fáil in 1992 (Mansergh, 1996).   
 
The Conservative British Government was clearly not convinced of this approach.  
Until the IRA cease-fire was announced in August 1994 the British government did 
not believe that it would happen.  The British Government sought to prioritise 
restarting talks between the traditional constitutional parties excluding Sinn Féin.  
Their focus was on minimal internal reform and a strategy to contain and marginalise 
the IRA campaign.  Even after the cease-fire the Conservative Government never 
became comfortable with the new Irish government approach and feared that 
bringing Sinn Féin into the talks process would reverse years of intensive efforts at 
isolating the Sinn Féin leadership.  This view effectively precipitated the ending of the 
IRA cease-fire in February 1996.  The new British Labour government elected in May 
1997,  while retaining some worries about the Irish government’s approach, sought to 
actively engage with the process, becoming a driving force for the final agreement. 
 
SDLP leader, John Hume had been a major influence on both the shape of the final 
agreement and the process that led to it and it is therefore not surprising that the 
SDLP gave it strong support.  The decision by Hume to engage in a lengthy process 
of talks with Sinn Féin in 1988 was central to the origins of the peace process.  Hume 
argued that a nationalist consensus, as sought by Sinn Féin during the 1987-88 SF-
SDLP talks, was indeed possible but that it could only take place in the context of an 
IRA cease-fire. These initial talks collapsed as the IRA did not see the need for a 
cease-fire at that time, and the collapse pushed the SDLP towards a new round of 
talks with the unionist parties and indeed a period of bitter attacks on Sinn Féin and 
the IRA.  It was the clear lack of progress in those talks (Mallie and McKittrick, 1996: 
153-4) which pushed Hume once again to seek to advance the political situation 
through talks with Sinn Féin. 
 
Unlike the SDLP the UUP abandoned previously held political positions to sign the 
agreement.  Most of the current UUP leadership, including Trimble, had been active 
in the unionist opposition to the more modest Sunningdale Agreement. Unionist 
opposition to Sunningdale had centred on the UUPs traditional opposition to power-




Furthermore in contrast to the current agreement the Sunningdale Agreement, made 
no provisions for prisoner releases, had no significant commitments to an equality 
agenda and promised a security crackdown on the IRA. 
 
The Good Friday agreement commits the two governments to maintaining the Union 
with Britain only for as long as that was the wish of a majority - a formal statement of 
what had been the position of the two governments and the SDLP for many years.  
The agreement also meant the return of a government and parliament to Northern 
Ireland, with David Trimble as its most likely First Minister. It also contained two 
paper victories for unionism.  The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which unionists 
has resolutely opposed was repealed and the Irish Government agreed to call a 
referendum seeking to amend Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution.  Unionism 
however also had to face a number of previously unthinkable propositions - they 
would be forced to share power not only with the SDLP but also with Sinn Féin, 
facing even the possibility of Sinn Féin in government.  They also had to agree to a 
cross border body with a much stronger structural position and powers than under 
‘Sunningdale’; the possibility of RUC reform, and equality measures which they had 
previously opposed.   
 
Given the unpalatable nature of the package on offer from the perspective of many 
unionists, an understanding of the UUPs willingness to support this agreement has to 
look beyond the actual content of the deal and examine the strategic choices 
available to mainstream unionism.  Unionism was faced with an Irish nationalist 
consensus that was growing and becoming increasingly politically united.   In 
addition the leaders of Irish nationalism, including northern nationalists, had formed 
an effective alliance with a US administration and a reasonable working relationship 
with the British Labour Government which was likely to be in power for another eight 
or nine years.  Northern nationalists now made up over 40% of the voting population, 
moderate unionism as represented by Alliance could mobilise at least 6%; the 
centrist Northern Ireland Women’s’ Coalition (NIWC) 1% and the loyalist 
paramilitaries 3%.  Mainstream unionism, for the first time since Partition was faced 
with the possibility that it could become a minority within Northern Ireland.  
Nationalists were still a long way from securing a majority for a united Ireland, but if 
nationalists were united they could clearly secure majority support in Northern Ireland 
in a referendum for far-reaching political change.  The UUP leadership were quite 
explicit about this threat during the negotiations.  Anthony Alcock argued that if the 
UUP walked out it  was likely that a section of mainstream unionists would vote in a 
referendum to accept a peace deal which had been negotiated in their absence 
(Northern Ireland Forum, 3 Oct. 1997, vol. 45, p.10).  The bottom line for the UUP 
leadership was that however unhappy they were with key elements of the deal,  any 
likely alternative was going to be much worse from a unionist perspective. 
 
For Sinn Féin, the agreement also fell short of what had in the past been key 
demands.  It clearly did not offer a united Ireland, it reaffirmed what republicans call 
the ‘unionist veto’ and contained no firm commitment to either disband or reform the 
RUC.  In spite of this Sinn Féin and their support base have been firm supporters of 
the deal.  Part of the explanation is to be found in the roots of Sinn Féin’s 
engagement with this peace process.  As late as May 1987 Sinn Féin produced a 
policy document - Scenario for Peace, in which, in line with the traditional republican 
position, the Irish Government is seen to play no role of any significance in either 
bringing about a united Ireland or building its new government.  The Irish 
Government was treated as a ‘Vichy’ like regime - effectively seeking to frustrate the 
republican movements attempts to secure Irish unity and as irrelevant after the event, 




following years Sinn Féin acknowledged publicly that the republican movement was 
not strong enough, on its own, to achieve a united Ireland and that therefore a ‘broad 
front’ of nationalist parties and organisations or a ‘nationalist consensus’ was 
required to achieve that goal (Adams, 1988). An Phoblacht (the republican weekly 
newspaper) changed its editorial style.  The pejorative term ‘Free State’ was no 
longer used to describe the Republic and its Government but more neutral terms like 
‘the South’ or the ‘26 Counties’ and the ‘Dublin administration’. There followed a shift 
in attitudes to constitutional nationalism. The SDLP and the Irish Government 
(especially Fianna Fáil and to a lesser extent Labour) were now seen as potential 
political allies rather than as simple collaborators with British rule. In a new policy 
document Towards a Lasting Peace (1992) Sinn Féin placed the Irish Government, 
and the need for a nationalist consensus, at the heart of its political strategy - 
marking a reversal of previous perspectives. 
 
The ending of the Cold War also created some pressure for change.  Other conflicts 
with which the IRA had identified were coming to conclusions or developing peace 
settlements in South Africa, Palestine and Central America (Cox, 1997: 676 & 682).  
The IRA campaign was clearly in a position of stalemate, it could not be militarily 
defeated, neither could it militarily succeed.  The election of Bill Clinton in November 
1992, with the overwhelmingly support of Irish Americans, saw the emergence of the 
first US administration with an interventionist policy on Northern Ireland. This new 
international context created its own dynamic for change and helped persuade the 
IRA leadership that more progress could be made if they called a cease-fire. 
 
Sinn Féin see this as an agreement in transition, part of the peace process, not its 
end point. While there are specific gains in the deal such as the North-South Council, 
the strengthening of fair employment legislation, support for Irish language schools 
and a debate on the future of the RUC.  The detail is to some extent less important 
than a clear commitment by the two governments to move away from the political 
and constitutional status quo.  
 
Sinn Féin’s strategy is influenced by the demographic situation, the rising nationalist 
vote - buoyed by expectations of change, by a rise in cultural nationalism and a 
sense of growing confidence in the nationalist community.  Nationalist voters appear 
to be increasing in militancy as Sinn Féin have significantly reduced the gap between 
them and the SDLP.  Sinn Féin recognised early on that a united Ireland was not 
going to be available at these talks and took the precaution of preparing their support 
base for the more limited objectives of the agreement.  The position of the Sinn Féin 
leadership was that they did not have the political support to achieve Irish unity but 
they could achieve, in alliance with other nationalists, the Irish Government and the 
US, a much strengthened equality agenda and institutional links between North and 
South and could create a dynamic for further progressive change.  The Sinn Féin 
leadership recognised the potential internal difficulties this relatively limited agenda 
might cause, but they, like the UUP were aware of the consequences of walking 
away, especially as their ‘peace strategy’ had seen their vote increase significantly.  
The commitment of republicanism to this argument is underlined by the calling of the 
second cease-fire in the full knowledge that a united Ireland would not be an 
outcome of the talks.  Sinn Féin perceived the agreement as strengthening the 
position of the nationalist community and weakening unionism even if in some 
respects it fell short of what they had hoped to achieve. 
 
The apparent shift in the stance of the loyalist parties - the Progressive Unionist Party 
(PUP), aligned with the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster 




surprised most commentators.  Initially the decision to call a loyalist cease-fire in 
October 1994 was at least partly a pragmatic response to the IRA cease-fire.  Their 
self image was one of counter-terrorism and an extended IRA cessation removed this 
crucial definitional prop. The circumstances of the post-cease-fire period however 
altered the political experience of the loyalist political parties.  Since the mid 1980s 
both major loyalist paramilitaries have been trying, without success, to follow Sinn 
Féin in building a strong political base in the context of an ongoing paramilitary 
campaign.  Post cease-fire, the profile of the PUP and UDP increased, as they acted 
as conduits to the paramilitaries.  The Conservative British Government also had a 
tactical need for the parties, as contacts with and concessions to Sinn Féin were 
easier to justify if they were seen as being mirrored by contacts with the PUP and 
UDP.  Thus the first public contact by officials with Sinn Féin was preceded by a 
meeting with the UDP and PUP and the first Ministerial meeting followed a similar 
pattern.  This new profile, and the conditions created by the cease-fires, seemed to 
offer to the parties an opportunity to do what they had failed to do in the past - build 
political bases independent of mainstream (and middle class) unionism.  As the 
peace process and cease-fire provided the opportunity for growth, seeking to attract 
support by adopting more hard line, anti-compromise rhetoric was unlikely to 
succeed, and therefore a shift to more moderate and reformist policies offered a line 
of development.  
 
The loyalist parties, in spite of their attempts to create an independent base for 
themselves, remained ideologically linked to mainstream unionism.  Right through 
the negotiations the PUP and UDP stuck firmly to the negotiation tactics adopted by 
the UUP.  For example neither the PUP or UDP ever publicly met Sinn Féin, or broke 
with any of the policy positions adopted by the UUP other than on issues such as 
decommissioning and prisoners where they clearly had a strong agenda of their own. 
They were also firm supporters of the Orange Order in their physical opposition to the 
banning of the contentious parade through the nationalist Garvaghy Road at 
Drumcree. While tactically astute, their strategy does place strains on organisations 
with so little experience of open political activity.  Already the UVF has lost some of 
its members to the breakaway Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) while rumours abound 
of splits in the UDA which in spite of being the larger paramilitary group have won 
more limited electoral support than the PUP. 
 
The rejection of the deal by the Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the 
smaller UK Unionist Party  (UKUP) and UUP dissidents was not surprising as they 
had been on the record over many years as opposing compromises and reform well 
short of what was in the Good Friday agreement.  From Sunningdale to the present 
they have followed a relatively consistent position.  All mainstream unionist elites 
have traditionally insisted that there is little point having a veto on the ‘final handover’ 
of sovereignty if they cannot prevent political decisions which change the character 
of the state and/or which move them towards a united Ireland.  It is this strong 
linkage of equality issues and constitutional issues which makes it impossible for 
those unionists who reject the deal to see commitments on the question of 
sovereignty as being sufficient to persuade them to support internal reform.  Reform 
is seen as undermining the state and paving the way for further change. This position 
was articulated by all the major unionist parties, including those who ultimately 
supported the agreement, as recently as 1997. (For example UUP response to the 
framework documents on the internet at www.uup.org and Alcock in Northern 
Ireland Forum 7 Feb. 1997, vol. 27, p.21)).  It is the adherence of the unionists who 
oppose the agreement to traditional unionist positions that presents difficulties for 
David Trimble.  He must convince unionists that either the commitments on 




persuade unionists that they have little choice but to go down this route - a more 
accurate but politically difficult message to sell. 
 
The Referendum Campaigns 
 
The political parties, despite their different perspectives, finally came to agreement in 
the pressure-cooker atmosphere of the talks in Belfast.  Last minute threats to the 
agreement led to US President Bill Clinton being woken at night to make personal 
appeals to some of the negotiators to make additional compromises.   The 
agreement itself provided for referenda to be held in Ireland , North and South, on 
May 22nd to ratify the agreement and to make the necessary constitutional changes 
to the Irish constitution. 
 
The response in the Republic of Ireland to the agreement was very positive but there 
was some initial reluctance to change Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution. The 
emergence of potential opposition to the amendment of the articles was postponed  
because Sinn Féin had taken a decision to hold a special conference before making 
a final decision on the deal, and it appeared in the immediate aftermath that they 
might support the deal while opposing changes to the Irish constitution.  The first 
opinion polls, before the Sinn Féin conference showed, a 61% yes vote, 20% no and 
19% undecided (Irish Times 16 Apr. 1998). A poll published the day after the 
conference, carried out when it was clear that the Sinn Féin leadership was actively 
seeking a yes vote, including the amendments to Articles 2 & 3, showed 72% yes to 
5% no and 23% undecided (Irish Times 14 May 1998).  As the two parties 
representing almost all northern nationalists were united in calling for a Yes vote and 
any opposition to changing Articles 2 & 3 evaporated in the hope of a dynamic new 
political future. 
 
The actual campaign lacked the impact of a normal referendum or election because 
of the widespread consensus in favour of a Yes vote.  Only Fianna Fáil ran a high 
profile and expensive advertising campaign - clearly hoping that the positive 
response to the agreement would also boost their party support.  They were right.  
The first opinion polls put Fianna Fáil leader Bertie Ahern’s personal approval rating 
at 84% and Fianna Fáil party support at 57% - an all time record over 25 years of 
polling (Irish Times 16 Apr. 1998). The outcome with a Yes vote of 94.4% reflected 
the consensus in the campaign. 
 
In Northern Ireland there were in reality two separate referendum campaigns, one in 
the nationalist and one in the unionist community.  Within the nationalist community, 
once the delegate conference had confirmed Sinn Féin’s position, the campaign, like 
that in the South, reflected the deep and widespread support for the agreement.  In 
contrast to this, within the unionist community there was a bitter campaign, beginning 
from the moment the agreement was finalised, with the ‘no’ lobby including not only 
those who had opposed the talks process - the DUP, UKUP and the LVF - but also 
elements of the UUP.  Those unionists who supported the deal promoted it in a very 
generalised way, as a hope for peace, while presenting the opposition as being 
caught in the past and, in particular lacking any credible alternative.  Unionist 
opponents of the deal were, however, the ones to set the agenda for the public 
debate. They argued that aspects of the agreement were so detrimental to the 
unionist position that unionists should not support it even if it did in parts meet some 
unionist demands.  It was further argued that if nationalist Ireland was 






The agreement to release republican and loyalist prisoners became the dominant 
issue in the early part of the campaign for the anti-agreement groups. In a bid to help 
the Sinn Féin leadership deal with potential internal dissent, the two governments 
agreed to transfer the longest serving IRA prisoners in jail in England (the Balcome 
Street Four) to the Republic of Ireland to serve out their sentences.  The Irish 
government then almost immediately gave them temporary releases to attend the 
Sinn Féin conference where the decision on the agreement was being made.  The 
prisoners received a rapturous reception when they entered the conference hall and 
the visual impact of convicted IRA members arm in arm with the Sinn Féin 
negotiators was used to good effect by the anti-agreement unionists. 
 
In addition to the entire question of prisoner releases the fact that the deal provided 
for the involvement of Sinn Féin in government, even if no IRA arms were 
decommissioned was a major sticking point for unionists. This clearly struck a chord 
with the unionist support base who were well used to hearing their leaders speak of 
the dangers of allowing any nationalists, even the moderate SDLP, into government.  
The provisions for the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, were also attacked 
by unionist opponents of the agreement as vague and inadequate.  Similarly the 
Commission on policing was seen as undermining the RUC and paving the way for 
its disbandment.   
 
Although Unionist opponents of the deal also objected to the all-Ireland nature of the 
North-South Ministerial Council the discussion on this was surprisingly low-key during 
the referendum in contrast to the intense debate during the negotiations.  It was, 
perhaps, this previous debate which had in some ways prepared the unionist 
community for compromise on this issues.  North-south bodies had been clearly part 
of the process (even if opposed by unionists) since at least the publication of the 
framework document agreed by the governments as a basis for negotiations in 
February 1995.  There had however been no significant attempt to persuade the 
mainstream unionist base to support reform in other areas, or any indication that 
unionists would support the release of prisoners or consider a form of power-sharing 
which would include Sinn Féin.  Until the very end the UUP opposed Sinn Féin’s 
involvement in the process and never negotiated with them directly.  The failure of 
the UUP to prepare their own supporters is probably due to the simple fact that they 
had not intended making these concessions.  Up to the last night of negotiations they 
tried to avoid having any form of executive in the Assembly in a bid to avoid ‘power-
sharing’.   It was only when the deadline was upon them and they were faced with 
the option of signing the deal or walking out, that they finally took the difficult 
decisions.  They therefore had little opportunity to prepare their support base for at 
least some of the concessions made. 
 
The unionist anti-agreement campaign was the most dynamic, it set the agenda for 
debate to a large extent and also in the early days deliberately gave the impression 
of daily increases in support with a planned media campaign, which staggered the 
announcement of the opposition to the agreement of a majority of UUP MPs at 
Westminster, the Young Unionist Council, the Queens University Unionist 
Association, former UUP leader James Molyneaux and crucially the Orange Order.  
Trimble regained the initiative, or at least stemmed the tide of dissent, when he 
received the backing of 70% of the UUP executive members and similar support at 
the 800 strong Ulster Unionist Council.  To this he could add the implicit and often 
explicit support of senior church figures, the major business organisations, and most 
of the local daily and weekly newspapers.  The failure to persuade the Orange Order 
to support the deal however greatly strengthened the ‘No’ campaign and remained at 





It became clear from the early opinion polls (e.g. Irish Times 16 Apr.; RTE 27 Apr.) 
that because of nationalists overwhelming support for the deal, and the support of a 
section of moderate unionists, the referendum would certainly pass.  The ‘no’ 
campaign therefore focused on the division within the unionist community - arguing 
that with a no vote above 30% they would have won a majority of unionist voters and 
that therefore, the deal would have no legitimacy.  While this position was rejected by 
nationalists as it implied that their votes were of less significance than unionist votes, 
(as no campaigners offered no corresponding veto over the nature of any political 
settlement to the nationalist community), it was effectively accepted by David Trimble 
when he said that a yes vote of less than 70% / 66% would be insufficient to move 
forward.  This gave the no side a target they could realistically hope to reach and 
gave their campaign momentum up to polling day.  There was also a sense that the 
limited campaign for a yes vote by the UUP leadership and the acceptance of a 70% 
threshold was being used tactically by Trimble to pressurise the British Government 
towards a more unionist perspective and to prevent further nationalist gains.  It was a 
dangerous tactic however as the strength of the No campaign was threatening to 
totally undermine Trimble’s position.  Ultimately Trimble probably realised this and 
the latter half of the campaign saw a more assertive effort to boost the yes vote. 
 
In Northern Ireland the yes vote at 71% was sufficiently conclusive to weaken the 
rejectionist camp but leaving them as an influential bloc within unionism, representing 
half of all mainstream unionists.  An exit poll carried out by RTE (available on the 
internet at www.rte.ie/referendum/nipoll) gives some indication of the break down of 
voting patterns in Northern Ireland.  It suggests that 99% of Catholics and 51% of 
Protestants voted yes.  It also suggests that 25% of UUP voters voted no - a sizeable 
body of dissent, and providing the basis for a significant split should any leading 
party figure decide to challenge Trimble’s leadership.  Somewhat ominously, in the 
light of their connections to the loyalist paramilitaries, 43% of UDP/PUP voters voted 
no. 
 
The Assembly Elections 
 
With only four weeks between the results of the referendum and the election to the 
new Northern Ireland Assembly the election campaign raised few new issues.  Within 
the nationalist community, as there were no serious anti-agreement candidates, the 
poll became yet another party-political contest between the SDLP and Sinn Féin for 
the long-term support of the nationalist community.  Sinn Féin argued that a vote for 
them would represent a stronger challenge to the status quo and would provide a 
greater degree of impetus for change. Sinn Féin’s vote had increased from 10% in 
1992 to 16% in the 1997 Westminster elections.  They were also attracting a younger 
vote than the SDLP.  The SDLP hoped to reverse the gains made by Sinn Féin in 
recent elections.  Their canvassing strategy focused on the argument that, because 
of the divisions within unionism, the SDLP could become the largest party in Northern 
Ireland if some Sinn Féin voters switched to them, and in those circumstances they 
argued that John Hume rather than David Trimble would be First Minister.  This was 
somewhat disingenuous because while there was indeed some prospect of the SDLP 
outpolling the UUP in percentage terms (in fact they did so) there was no realistic 
prospect of the SDLP winning more seats because of the wider base of lower 
preference votes which the UUP was likely to attract. 
 
The anti-agreement unionists used the same tactics and arguments as they had 
advanced in the referendum campaign to try and achieve a block large enough to 




needed to attract more votes than received by the anti-agreement parties, the DUP 
and the UKUP, in previous elections.  To this end these parties along with those 
within the UUP who opposed the agreement formed a ‘United Unionist’ platform to 
seek to improve their capacity to attract dissident UUP voters and also to maximise 
transfers in the PRSTV election. There were also some very bitter election 
conventions within the UUP as pro and anti UUP members sought to win the party 
nominations.  David Trimble attempted to minimise the vote gathering capabilities of 
the anti-agreement candidates by invoking party rules to prohibit the UUP 
Westminster MPs who opposed the agreement  from standing in the Assembly 
election.  This was fiercely contested by supporters of Jeffrey Donaldson MP but 
Trimble stood firm and prevented Donaldson from standing.  While Donaldson 
accepted this decision other lesser known figures from within the UUP who failed to 
secure official party backing stood as anti-agreement independent unionists. 
 
The results were significant for a number of reasons.  The UUP vote fell to its lowest 
level ever (21.2%).  The SDLP just outpolled the UUP gaining 22% but the UUP 
received more transfers in the PRSTV system and so won 28 seats to the SDLPs 24.  
Sinn Féin got its highest ever vote at 17.7% (an increase of 75% since the start of 
the public phase of the peace process in 1992) and narrowed the gap on the SDLP 
to a mere 4.3%. SDLP support increased by 0.5% from their 1996 Forum elections.  
The Alliance Party faired poorly with only 6.5% and 6 seats and no prospect of a 
executive seat.  The NIWC won 2 seats with only 1% of the overall vote due to high 
levels of lower preference votes (from SF and the PUP to help them defeat Alliance 
in South Belfast and from the SDLP to defeat the UUP and DUP in North Down).  
The PUP won two seats with 2.2% but the UDP with only 1.1% failed to win a seat, 
leaving one of the main loyalist paramilitaries with no political representation in the 
Assembly.  In addition to this party support there were three anti-agreement unionist 
elected as independents.  The combined nationalist vote was therefore 39.7%.  The 
unionist anti-agreement parties (DUP and UKUP) polled 22.6%, compared to the 
UUPs 21.2% which also included voters for some opponents of the deal who had 
managed to secure party nominations.  This gave the mainstream unionist parties a 
total vote of 43.8% - not a great deal more than the nationalist parties. 
 
Table 3 Percentage votes received by each party in 1996 Forum and 1998 
Assembly elections 
Party Forum 1996 Assembly 1998 
UUP 24.17 21.23 
SDLP 21.37 21.99 
DUP 18.8 18.03 
SF 15.47 17.65 
Alliance 6.54 6.5 
UKUP 3.69 4.52 
PUP 3.47 2.22 
NIWC 1.03 1.61 
UDP 2.22 1.07 
Labour 0.85 0.34 
 
 
In addition to analysing first preference votes, the PRSTV electoral system can also 
show how voters expressed their lower preferences, though there are technical 
difficulties in extracting all the potentially relevant information (For a discussion on 
these difficulties see Richard Sinnott in Irish Times 29 June 1998 - available on the 




in Northern Ireland is tentative, as there are only 18 constituencies and therefore 
often very few examples of transfers between any two given parties. 
 
The results do however reveal that Sinn Féin has the most loyal party voters with 
87% of all their supporters transferring to another Sinn Féin candidate when one was 
available.  68% of Sinn Féin voters then transferred to the SDLP,  however only 45% 
of SDLP voters returned the favour, and transferred to Sinn Féin candidates.  
Alliance voters, where they had a choice, on average went 36% to the UUP and 33% 
to the SDLP.  There were simply no examples of terminal transfers from the UUP to 
the PUP or UDP or from the PUP to the UDP.  Transfers from the UDP, to the PUP 
were not as high as might have been anticipated, varying from 26% to 40%.   PUP 
transfers to the UUP were reasonably high at 43%, and PUP transfers to Alliance 
varied between 8% to 20%. There was a wide distribution of the remainder of the 
PUP votes, mainly among the various anti-agreement candidates. 
 
There was little evidence of cross-community transfers from pro-agreement UUP 
voters to the SDLP and vice versa. Voters mainly transferred within their own 
traditional blocs.  There are only a few cases to look at, but even when Alliance was 
not available only 36% of UUP voters transferred to the SDLP and  even this figure of 
36% does not really give any real indication of the cross-community focus of UUP 
voters as it is greatly inflated by transfers from the UUP to the SDLP in nationalist 
constituencies where the object was to defeat Sinn Féin and not anti-agreement 
unionists.  A majority of UUP voters preferred to transfer to anti-agreement unionists 
rather than the pro-agreement nationalist SDLP when that choice was available.  In 
South Down only 12 % of a UUP surplus went to the SDLP while nearly 75% went to 
anti-agreement unionists.  In East Antrim, while the number of UUP voters willing to 
transfer to the SDLP when no UUP candidate remained was nearly 25%, the anti-
agreement unionists still received the majority of the transfers. Many UUP voters 
failed even to distinguish between the SDLP and Sinn Féin.  In Newry and Armagh 
and West Tyrone less than 40% of UUP voters transferred to the SDLP in their fight 
for the last seat with Sinn Féin.   
 










Ind. anti-agreement unionists 3 
 
With 28 seats or 48.2% of the unionist bloc the anti-agreement unionists are 
somewhat short of the number needed to prevent decisions being taken.  It has been 
widely reported that 30 seats would be sufficient for them to do so - marking a 
majority of declared unionists.  This is not strictly true.  First of all the Women’s 
Coalition have indicated that though currently registered as ‘Other’ they would 
redesignate themselves as unionists if necessary, raising the 50% threshold to 31.  
Although the Alliance Party seemed reluctant to do this prior to the election, their 
leader John Alderdice resigned in the aftermath of the party’s poor performance, and 
under a new leader and faced with a real threat they might also register as unionists 




cross-community basis if there is a 60% yes vote in th Assembly, including at least 
40% of each community (Method 2 in table 2), thus requiring the dissidents to get 35 
votes at least and 52 if the NIWC and Alliance reregister.  Practically however this 
could present difficulties for David Trimble if his support in the UUP was to decline so 
seriously. 
 
Having elected David Trimble as First Minister and the SDLPs Seamus Mallon as 
Deputy First Minister the Assembly adjourned until September.  It is required to form 
an executive and set up the North-South Council, before 31 October and must also 
deal with the political realities of prisoner releases, the likelihood that no 
decommissioning will have taken place and pressure for reform on the equality 





Clearly the long-term impact of the Good Friday agreement remains to be tested.  
After 30 years of armed conflict a permanent solution will take some time to build and 
acts of violence may continue for a time.  Nonetheless for the first time, an 
agreement has been reached which has the support of the main republican and 
loyalist paramilitaries, the political representatives of almost the entire northern 
nationalist community, the largest unionist party and the two governments.  It is also 
the first agreement to be ratified in referenda north and south in Ireland. 
 
The content of the agreement itself also provides grounds for hope.  For nationalists 
there is institutionalised power-sharing between the nationalist and unionist 
communities; there is the promise of far reaching measures to promote equality and 
parity of esteem and a structure of governance linking north and south with an open 
ended and dynamic agenda.  Mainstream unionism is clearly divided.  A bare 
majority are pro-agreement, seeing the benefits of the cease-fires, a new Assembly 
and government and a commitment by nationalists to pursue Irish unity by peaceful 
means and to seek the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland for Irish unity.  An 
almost equally large section of unionists are however unwilling to support an 
agreement which will result in power-sharing with the SDLP and Sinn Féin, the 
release of prisoners. far reaching internal reform and an institutionalised north-south 
link.   
 
Unionism is clearly in a state of flux.  Potentially for the first time mainstream unionist 
political elites are willing to redefine their relationship with the northern nationalist 
community and with the Republic of Ireland, and build a polity based on equality of 
citizenship and a growing relationship with the South.  There are also danger signs 
within unionism.  Almost half of all Protestants and a majority of mainstream unionists 
have rejected the deal.  Prominent figures within the UUP and Orange Order are 
unreconciled to these new possibilities and see the agreement as fundamentally 
damaging to the unionist position. Even within pro-agreement unionism there are 
signs of unease.  David Trimble has yet to meet Sinn Féin (August 1998).  The UUP 
continues to insist that the RUC will not be disbanded or significantly reformed.  The 
potential for a split in the UUP remains and such a split could create a movement 
representing a majority of unionists, committed to bringing down the agreement. 
 
For the moment however the agreement stands.  The peace process has delivered 
sustained IRA and loyalist cease-fires, has brought a political agreement and has 
created a dynamic for change to replace years of political stalemate.  For the 
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